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ABSTRACT
Prompted by widespread concerns about public school quality, a growing empirical literature has
measured the effects of greater choice on school performance. This paper contributes to that
literature in three ways. First, it makes the observation that the overall effect of greater choice, which
has been the focus of prior research, can be decomposed into demand and supply components:
knowing the relative sizes of the two is very relevant for policy. Second, using rich data from a large
metropolitan area, it provides a direct and intuitive measure of the competition each school faces.
This takes the form of a school-specific elasticity that measures the extent to which reductions in
school quality would lead to reductions in demand. Third, the paper provides evidence that these
elasticity measures are strongly related to school performance: a one-standard deviation increase in
the competitiveness of a school's local environment within the Bay Area leads to a 0.15 standard
deviation increase in average test scores. This positive correlation is robust and is consistent with
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1  INTRODUCTION 
    Dissatisfaction with the quality of public education in the United States has prompted 
considerable interest in reforms that increase choice and stimulate competition in the school 
system. The standard notion, drawing on the theory of the firm, is that increasing the range of 
options households can choose from forces incumbent public schools to compete more vigorously 
– for market share, better students, and financial resources.  In turn (continuing the firm analogy), 
this should lead schools to better respond to the needs of students and their families, use available 
resources more efficiently, and exert greater effort, thereby improving public school performance. 
Because schools lack a strict profit motive, however, the extent to which public schools do 
actually respond to increased competition has become a central empirical question in the 
education literature. 
In prior work, numerous papers have examined the effects of greater choice on public 
school performance, typically using across-metropolitan area variation in indices of public school 
concentration or measures of private school availability.
1 In so doing, this literature has grappled 
with endogeneity problems related to the simultaneous determination of public school 
performance and these measures of choice, in addition to omitted variable biases.
2 The evidence 
to emerge from this literature looking at the effect of increased choice on school performance is 
mixed, ranging from little effect to a modest positive impact of increased choice on school 
performance.
3 
While the concepts of choice and competition are invariably linked in the broad policy 
and academic debates about education reform, they are not synonymous from an economic 
                                                      
1 See Belfield and Levin (2002) for an extensive review of forty one empirical studies in this literature.  
2 See Hoxby (1994, 2000), Figlio and Stone (1999), Jepsen (1999), Hanushek and Rivkin (2003), and 
Rothstein (2003). 
3 Researchers have also examined the efficiency of public school spending using alternative research 
designs. Barrow and Rouse (2004), for example, examine the efficiency of per pupil spending using 
variation in state aid while Millimet and Rangaprasad (2005) explore the spatial autocorrelation in school 
input decisions.   2 
 
perspective.
4 Choice in this context relates to the availability of schooling alternatives faced by 
households, while the economic notion of competition is best captured by the residual
5 elasticity 
of demand that a school faces.  Such an elasticity measures the extent to which a school’s 
enrollment and resources are affected by a change in its performance: the greater is this elasticity, 
the more competitive is the environment in which it operates. In considering the effect of 
competition on school performance, one would ideally like to isolate the impact of a change in 
this primitive – a school’s residual elasticity of demand – on school performance.  
    In practice, the measures of choice used in the literature tend to be related to competition 
because an increase in the availability of schooling options or in the ease of selecting these 
options is likely to increase the residual elasticity of demand faced by incumbent schools, thereby 
making the market more competitive. But the overall impact of increased choice on school 
performance depends on both demand and supply factors, combining (i) the effect of increased 
choice on the competitiveness of local market (i.e., extent to which increased choice raises the 
residual elasticity of demand faced by schools) and (ii) the effect of increased competition on 
school performance. The first of these reflects factors on the demand side of the education 
market, and is likely to vary depending on the way that choice increases.
6 The latter effect isolates 
the supply-side response to greater competition - the response of individual schools to variation in 
the competitiveness of the environment in which they operate. 
    By focusing on the overall effect of choice on school performance, the existing literature 
provides only indirect guidance as to the magnitude of the responsiveness of schools to 
                                                      
4 The distinctness of these concepts can be made clear by noting that, in principle, choice could increase 
without any increase in competition.  For example, private school vouchers could be given to parents 
wholeheartedly opposed to private schools. Likewise, the competitiveness of the education market place 
could change without any change in the set of available schooling options. For instance, broad changes in 
the demand for school quality or technological improvements in the quality of information available to 
households about school performance might increase residual demand elasticities even in the absence of an 
explicit change in choice. 
5 We use the term ‘residual’ in the sense that the elasticity results from a change in just that school’s 
quality. 
6 For example, choice variation from geographic accessibility to private schools may have a quite different 
impact on competition than policies such as within-district school choice programs   3 
 
competition (supply responsiveness). Yet the distinction between demand vs. supply 
responsiveness is important both for understanding the economics of education markets and for 
policy. To the extent that an overall modest positive effect of choice on performance is driven by 
a sizeable impact of choice on competition and a limited responsiveness of schools to increased 
competition, this suggests that policies targeted at improving incentives for schools to respond to 
competition are likely to have strong performance effects. On the other hand, if schools are highly 
responsive to changes in competition (as we will find) but the current system does not engender a 
very competitive environment, policies aimed at increasing demand elasticities would seem more 
promising. Such policies might, for example, increase the ability of parents to choose from a 
wider set of schools or provide better information about quality differences among the available 
options. 
In terms of magnitudes, a reading of the existing education demand literature suggests 
that the demand side component of the overall effect of choice on school performance may in fact 
be quite small. This conclusion is robust across a wide variety of different research designs: (i) 
examining differences in housing prices along school assignment boundaries or as school 
assignments are changed over time;
7 (ii) estimating the heterogeneity in willingness to pay for 
school quality using a model of residential sorting;
8 (iii) examining the academic performance of 
winners versus losers following randomized school choice lotteries;
9 and (iv) examining how 
student performance varies with measures of school district enrollment concentration across 
metropolitan areas.
10 This leaves open the possibility that the responsiveness of schools to 
                                                      
7 Black (1999) pioneered the use of school assignment boundary fixed effects, estimating that a school-
level standard deviation in average test score is associated with approximately a 2 percent increase in house 
value. Kane, Staiger, and Riegg (2004) report almost an identical result using boundary fixed effects. This 
latter paper also reports results based on changes in school assignment, although these are less conclusive. 
8 Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003) incorporate school district boundary fixed effects in estimating a 
model of residential sorting, returning an estimated mean marginal willingness to pay for a standard 
deviation increase in average test score of approximately 2 percent of house value; they also find evidence 
of heterogeneity around this mean, as well as strong preferences relating to the characteristics of neighbors. 
9 Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2003) find little evidence that winners of randomized lotteries perform better in 
the schools that they subsequently select than losers who do not have the same degree of choice.  
10 Rothstein (2003) finds little evidence that sorting is related to school rather than peer characteristics.   4 
 
increases in competition may be sizeable despite the mixed results of the previous literature 
exploring the impact of choice on performance.  
In this paper, we set out evidence based on a new approach for studying the effects of 
competition on school performance. At the heart of the analysis, we develop a school-specific 
measure that captures the extent to which reductions in school quality would lead to reductions in 
demand. This measure has intuitive appeal: a school is taken to operate in a competitive 
environment if slight reductions in school quality would lead to a substantial reduction in demand 
for the neighborhoods from which the school draws its students, as measured by the 
corresponding decline in local house values.  
    To estimate these elasticity measures, we begin by estimating a rich model of residential 
sorting using data on the precise location decisions of nearly a quarter of a million households in 
California. In estimating the model, we are careful to address an important endogeneity problem 
that arises due to the correlation of school quality and neighborhood sociodemographic 
characteristics with unobserved aspects of housing and neighborhood quality (a correlation that is 
induced by residential sorting), implementing a boundary fixed effects strategy closely related to 
that of Black (1999). The resulting preference estimates are reasonable in magnitude across a 
wide set of housing, schooling, and neighborhood attributes.  
    With these preference estimates in hand, we estimate a measure of the elasticity of 
demand faced by each of over 700 elementary schools in the San Francisco Bay Area, carrying 
out a series of school-specific simulations that calculate the change in demand from raising that 
school’s quality by a fixed amount, holding the quality of all other schools fixed. We then explore 
the relationship between these elasticity measures and public school performance, as measured by 
standardized tests. If schools simply maximize quality, measured by test scores given their 
available resources, then the elasticity would be irrelevant to a school’s quality-setting decision. 
In contrast, if (at the other extreme) schools were rent-seeking or prone to make mistakes in   5 
 
allocating resources, then the elasticity would play a key role, as in the textbook theory of the 
firm.   
    Our results from this empirical exercise are striking and robust.  We find strong evidence 
that higher demand elasticities are associated with increases in public school achievement scores, 
with little effect on resource use, indicating that productivity improves.  Each reported 
specification includes controls for a wide set of student, school, household and neighborhood 
attributes (including all the variables that are included in the demand model). The same findings 
persist regardless of which student, school, and neighborhood characteristics we condition on, 
and the magnitude of the estimated effect is quite large: a one standard deviation increase in the 
competitiveness of a school’s local market within the Bay Area is associated with a 0.15 standard 
deviation increase in school performance.  
    These achievement increases are also accompanied by, if anything, slight reductions in 
teacher quality measures.  This helps to allay concerns about the role of omitted variables in these 
regressions. Such concerns are also eased by specifications that demonstrate that the predicted 
effect of our elasticity measures on neighborhood capital income is negative and insignificant. In 
terms of heterogeneous effects, while we find that all types of schools respond to increased 
competition, school responsiveness is greater in more educated communities. 
     In general, our estimated elasticity measures will depend on two factors: (i) the set of 
households served by the school (how mobile the types of households are that a school serves in 
general) and (ii) the availability of close substitutes in the education market place. By including 
controls for a wide set of student, school, household and neighborhood attributes, including all 
the variables that are included in the demand model in the analysis, we seek to isolate only the 
latter form of variation (i.e., the availability of close substitutes) in our elasticity measure. To 
provide additional confidence in our baseline results, we relate our elasticity measure to indices 
created directly from the data that characterize the availability of close substitutes in terms of 
neighborhood and school characteristics in the local geographic market. In particular, we   6 
 
construct dissimilarity indices that describe the extent to which the schools/neighborhoods are 
isolated in quality space relative to their closest neighbors. We demonstrate that our elasticity 
measure is strongly correlated with these dissimilarity measures and that these dissimilarity 
measures are correlated with school performance in a manner consistent with our baseline results.  
These results have implications for the broader choice debate. That we find such sizeable 
effects in the San Francisco Bay Area is somewhat surprising given California’s public finance 
system, which limits the effect of local property values on school resources. This suggests that 
supply responsiveness may be even larger in other states. Moreover, it suggests that mechanisms 
at work more generally, such as monitoring which might respond to changes in local property 
values, may provide enough of an incentive for schools even in the absence of the direct tying of 
resources to property values.  The findings are of relevance to the broader choice debate. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section motivates our empirical 
approach. Section 3 sets out the demand model and Section 4 describes its estimation and 
addresses important identification issues. Section 5 describes the rich data used in the analysis, 
and Section 6 discusses our demand estimates and the way these are used to construct a residual 
elasticity of demand for each school, based on meaningful variation in the data. Section 7 
discusses the supply-side regressions that yield our main results, and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2  SCHOOL CHOICE AND COMPETITION 
  In this section, we motivate more fully the use of the residual elasticity of demand as our 
preferred competition measure. We then describe how we use this to shed light on the direct 
effect of competition on public school performance.  
  The residual elasticity of demand measures the change in demand in response to a change 
in school quality. To see why this provides natural measure of competition, consider a stylized 
model of a local education market. The agents on the demand side comprise households with 
children; the supply side consists of teachers and school administrators. Household preferences   7 
 
are defined over consumption, housing services and school quality, and households choose where 
to live and where to send their children to school (there may be private school alternatives) based 
on quality and cost. Suppose school quality is unidimensional, measured by standardized tests. 
Quality is the output of a public school education production technology that converts student 
characteristics, school resources, teacher quality, and discretionary teacher and administrator 
effort into a performance measure.
11     
  Public school objectives are potentially complex, not least because public schools tend to 
be heavily regulated. For simplicity, we will treat the school as a single effort-making body, and 
consider two polar cases. On the one hand, public schools could aim to maximize school quality, 
given resources; on the other, public schools could aim to maximize rents, which are increasing in 
school revenues (and thus enrollment) and decreasing in effort cost.  
  If schools were quality maximizers, then quality would be set independent of 
considerations about the effect that it would have on enrollment. School personnel would simply 
set effort at the maximal level consistent with their continued participation in the schooling 
sector. Significantly, under quality maximization, the school production function would be seen 
directly in the data, and the elasticity of demand would have no effect on school performance. 
  In contrast, under rent seeking, a school would face the following trade-off: by raising 
quality (through higher effort), it would increase enrollment, and if funding were on a per-pupil 
basis, this would lead to an increase in revenues. At the same time, higher quality would require 
higher effort, which is costly. How the school would resolve this trade-off in making its optimal 
effort choice would depend in part on the size of the marginal benefit of higher effort. This, in 
turn, would depend on the response of demand (measured by school enrollment) to higher quality 
– the residual elasticity of demand. Clearly, in a rent-seeking world, the elasticity of demand 
                                                      
11 In practice, school personnel have other choice variables than effort, such as school resources.   8 
 
would affect school production via discretionary effort choice: as the elasticity rose, so the school 
would have greater incentive to raise quality so as to avoid a significant loss of enrollment.
12 
  This discussion motivates our main estimating equation, which relates measured school 
performance to a set of relevant determinants: the characteristics of students, school inputs, 
teacher characteristics, and neighborhood controls, including our measure of local competition, 
the residual elasticity of demand. Teacher and administrator effort is not observed by the 
researcher, but (depending on school objectives) might be influenced by market conditions. We 
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where T  is school m’s average test score, Xc
m is a vector of the characteristics of the children that 
attend the school m, Xn
m represents a set of neighborhood controls, E
m is the elasticity of demand, 
γc, γn and γE are coefficients to be estimated, and εm is a random error term. This is the equation 
we will take to the data, with interest focusing on the γE coefficient. 
  Beyond the stylized model, there are a variety of reasons why public schools might be 
responsive to the residual elasticity of demand, consistent with a positive estimate for γE. A high 
elasticity might make homeowners more sensitive to school behavior, leading to better 
monitoring and more active political involvement in elections for school board and other local 
officials. In some school finance regimes, property values determine local property taxes and thus 
influence school revenue; thus schools would have an incentive in such settings to care about the 
effect of school quality on local property prices. Conversely, there are clear reasons why schools 
might not be responsive: teaching and administrative positions afford a good deal of job security; 
                                                      
12 In practice, it is unlikely that schools are pure rent-seekers. However, to the extent that they have some 
discretion over quality setting, and depart from pure quality maximization, so the elasticity of demand will, 
to some degree, influence school quality setting.   9 
 
and political pressure might be ineffective if elections were for positions (such as mayor) where 
schooling is only one among many competing issues. 
 
Construction of the Elasticity 
  It is an empirical question just how strong these incentives to respond to competition are. 
To shed light on this issue, we estimate the key equation (1) above using a rich data set from the 
San Francisco Bay Area. For this purpose, we construct a set of school-specific elasticities in 
which demand is measured in terms of local housing values,
13 and quality is measured using 
school average test scores, conditioning on school and student characteristics. The corresponding 
residual elasticity for a given school captures the change in local house prices as school quality 
changes. 
  The residual elasticities are not directly observed in the data. Rather, we estimate them in 
the following way: first, rich Census data are used to estimate a flexible demand system, taking 
careful account of endogeneity issues on the demand side of the market and making explicit the 
way that individual demands aggregate up to form a housing market equilibrium using an 
equilibrium model of the housing market. We then use these demand estimates in combination 
with the equilibrium model to perform a series of simple counterfactual experiments. In 
particular, for each of 708 elementary schools in the Bay Area, we use the equilibrium model to 
conduct a simple counterfactual simulation, raising its average test score by 0.1 standard 
deviation (7.76 test score points) and calculating the new housing market equilibrium. This has 
the effect of increasing house values in the corresponding neighborhood catchment area; the 
resulting predicted change in house values, given the change in school quality, is then used in the 
estimating various specifications of the regression shown in equation (1). 
                                                      
13 Alternatively, demand could be measured based on student enrollment (or even enrollment of specific 
types of student). We intend to explore alternative measures in subsequent analyses.   10 
 
  Unlike prior work, it is important to note that our approach provides estimates of school-
specific elasticities, rather than MSA-level average choice indices. Constructing our elasticities 
from a single financing regime, rather than looking across MSAs, has the advantage that one 
would expect the incentives to respond to competition to vary with financing: our approach will 
better allow us to identify the direct effect of competition. We note that under California’s local 
public finance system, the marginal dollar comes from the state rather than from local property 
taxes. This might be expected to provide weaker incentives to respond to competition, as schools 
are less able to take advantage of quality improvements directly. In turn, it is likely to provide 
lower bound on incentives to respond to competition, worth remembering when it comes to 
interpreting the economic significance of our results.  
 
3  DEMAND 
To measure the impact of racial sorting on the consumption of neighborhood amenities, 
we now turn to a model of the residential location decision of households in the Bay Area. In 
developing such a model, our goal is to provide the simplest analytical tool that can account for 
(i) heterogeneity in both household attributes and the attributes of houses/neighborhoods and (ii) 
the endogenous determination of housing prices and neighborhood sociodemographic 
compositions.  
To this end, we adopt the equilibrium model of an urban housing market developed in 
Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2005). This equilibrium model consists of two key elements: the 
household residential location decision problem and a market-clearing condition. While 
maintaining a simple structure, the model allows households to have heterogeneous preferences 
defined over housing and neighborhood attributes in a very flexible way; it also allows for 
housing prices and neighborhood sociodemographic compositions to be determined in 
equilibrium. In estimating the model, we are careful to account for the correlation that naturally 
arises between unobserved housing and neighborhood attributes and both housing prices and   11 
 
neighborhood composition.
14 Having estimated the model, we then use it to construct our 
measures of the elasticity of demand faced by each school. 
 
The Residential Location Decision.  We model the residential location decision of each 
household as a discrete choice of a single residence from a set of house types available in the 
market. The utility function specification is based on the random utility model developed in 
McFadden (1973, 1978) and the specification of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), which 
includes choice-specific unobservable characteristics. Let Xh represent the observable 
characteristics of housing choice h, including characteristics of the house itself (e.g., size, age, 
and type), its tenure status (rented vs. owned), and the characteristics of its neighborhood (e.g., 
crime, land use, and topography). As above, let Th represent the quality of the local elementary 
school as measured by its average test score. We use the notation capital letter Zh to represent the 
average sociodemographic characteristics of the corresponding neighborhood, writing it 
separately from the other housing and neighborhood attributes to make explicit the fact that these 
characteristics are determined in equilibrium. Let ph denote the price of housing choice h and, 
finally, let dh
i denote the distance from residence h to the primary work location of household i. 
























                                                      
14 A long line of theoretical studies, including important papers by Epple, Filimon and Romer (EFR) (1984, 
1993), Benabou (1993, 1996), Anas and Kim (1995), Anas (2002), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 1998), 
and Nechyba (1999, 2000) have developed and used models of sorting to analyze the way that 
interdependent individual decisions in the housing market aggregate up to determine the equilibrium 
structure of a metropolitan area. In recent years, a new line of empirical research has sought to take these 
models to the data. Epple and Sieg (1999) develop an estimator for the equilibrium sorting model of EFR, 
providing the first unified treatment of theory and empirics in the literature. In the same vein, Sieg et al. 
(2004) use this approach to explore the general equilibrium impacts of air quality improvements in the Los 
Angeles Basin.    12 
 
The error structure of the indirect utility is divided into a correlated component associated with 
each housing choice that is valued the same by all households, ξh, and an individual-specific term, 
ε
i
h. A useful interpretation of ξh is that it captures the unobserved quality of each housing choice, 
including any unobserved quality associated with its neighborhood.  
Each household’s valuation of choice characteristics is allowed to vary with its own 
characteristics,  z
i, including education, income, race, employment status, and household 
composition. Specifically, each parameter associated with housing and neighborhood 
characteristics and price, α
i
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with equation (3) describing household i’s preference for choice characteristic j.  
This specification of the utility function gives rise to a horizontal model of sorting in 
which households have preferences defined distinctly over each choice characteristic including 
both school quality and neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics.
15 This contrasts with 
vertical models, which restrict households to have preferences over a single locational index, 
thereby constraining households to have the same preference ordering across locations.
16 The 
                                                      
15 The horizontal specification also captures the geography of the urban housing market very naturally, 
allowing households to have preferences over neighborhoods depending on the distance from their 
employment locations. This gives rise to variation in the aggregate demand for housing in various 
neighborhoods throughout the metro area, thereby increasing equilibrium housing prices in neighborhoods 
near employment centers. 
16 It is important to point out that this flexible feature of our model is made possible because we abstract 
from issues related to local politics. As Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1993) note, incorporating local politics 
into models of residential sorting requires restrictions to be placed on preferences in order to guarantee the 
existence of an equilibrium. Important recent papers by Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer and Sieg 
(2001) estimate equilibrium models that include voting over the level of public goods, restricting 
households to have shared rankings over a single public goods  index. We view our model as having a 
comparative rather than absolute advantage over the papers in that line of the literature, better suited for an   13 
 
additional flexibility of the horizontal model is especially relevant for this paper as it is the 
magnitude of the heterogeneity in preferences for neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics 
that will determine the extent to which the initial stratification induced by the variation in school 
quality across the metropolitan area is reinforced by additional sorting due to preferences for 
one’s neighbors.  
 
Characterizing the Housing Market. As with all models in the broad sorting literature, the 
existence of a sorting equilibrium is much easier to establish if the individual residential location 
decision problem is smoothed in some way. To this end, we assume that the housing market can 
be fully characterized by a set of housing types that is a subset of the full set of available houses, 
letting the supply of housing of type h be given by Sh. We also assume that each household 
observed in the sample represents a continuum of households with the same observable 
characteristics, with the distribution of idiosyncratic tastes ε
i
h mapping into a set of choice 
probabilities that characterize the distribution of housing choices that would result for the 
continuum of households with a given set of observed characteristics.
17     
Given the household’s problem described in equations (2)-(3), household i chooses 
housing type h if the utility that it receives from this choice exceeds the utility that it receives 
from all other possible house choices - that is, when  
 
























h includes all of the non-idiosyncratic components of the utility function V
i
h. As the 
inequalities in (4) imply, the probability that a household chooses any particular choice depends 
                                                                                                                                                              
institutional setting such as that which holds in Californian, where Proposition 13 leaves almost no 
discretion over property tax rates or the level of public goods spending at the local level. 
17 For expositional ease and without loss of generality, let the measure of this continuum be one.    14 
 
in general on the characteristics of the full set of possible house types. Thus the probability P
i
h 
that household i chooses housing type h can be written as a function of the full vectors of housing 
and neighborhood characteristics (both observed and unobserved) and prices {X, Z, p, ξ}:
18 
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as well as the household’s own characteristics z
i. 
Aggregating the probabilities in equation (5) over all observed households yields the 
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In order for the housing market to clear, the demand for houses of type h must equal the supply of 
such houses and so: 
 
(7)  h S P h S D h
i
i
h h h ∀ = ⇒ ∀ = ∑ , .  
 
Given the decentralized nature of the housing market, prices are assumed to adjust in order to 
clear the market.  The implications of the market clearing condition defined in equation (6) for 
prices are very standard, with excess demand for a housing type causing price to be bid up and 
excess supply leading to a fall in price. Given the indirect utility function defined in (1) and a 
fixed set of housing and neighborhood attributes, Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004) show that 
a unique set of prices (up to a scale) clears the market.  
                                                      
18 For the purposes of characterizing the equilibrium properties of the model, we include an individual’s   15 
 
Given that some neighborhood attributes are endogenously determined by the sorting 
process itself, we define a sorting equilibrium as a set of residential location decisions and a 
vector of housing prices such that the housing market clears and each household makes its 
optimal location decision given the location decisions of all other households. In equilibrium, the 
vector of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics along with the corresponding vector of 
market clearing prices must give rise to choice probabilities in equation (4) that aggregate back 
up to the same vector of neighborhood sociodemographics.
19 Whether this model gives rise to 
multiple equilibria depends on the distributions of preferences and available housing choices as 
well as the utility parameters. In general, it is impossible to establish that the equilibrium is 
unique  a priori. However, estimation of the model does not require the computation of an 
equilibrium nor uniqueness more generally, as we describe in the next section. We discuss the 
issue of uniqueness further in the context of calculating our demand elasticity measures below. 
 
4  DEMAND ESTIMATION 
Estimation of the model follows a two-stage procedure closely related to that developed 
in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). This section outlines the estimation procedure; a rigorous 
presentation is contained in Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2003) and is included in a technical 
appendix. It is helpful in describing the estimation procedure to first introduce some notation. In 
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where 
                                                                                                                                                              
employment location in z
i and the residential location in Xh. 
19 Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004) establish the existence of a sorting equilibrium as long as (i) the 
indirect utility function shown in equation (2) is decreasing in housing prices for all households; (ii) 
indirect utility is a continuous function of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics; and (iii) ε is 
drawn from a continuous density function.   16 
 












































= ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = = 1 1 1 1
α α α α λ . 
 
In equation (9), δh captures the portion of utility provided by housing type h that is common to all 
households, and in (10), k indexes household characteristics. When the household characteristics 
included in the model are constructed to have mean zero, δh is the mean indirect utility provided 
by housing choice h. The unobservable component of δh, ξh, captures the portion of unobserved 
preferences for housing choice h that is correlated across households, while εh
i represents 
unobserved preferences over and above this shared component.  
  The first step of the estimation procedure is equivalent to a Maximum Likelihood 
estimator applied to the individual location decisions taking prices and neighborhood 
sociodemographic compositions as given,
20 returning estimates of the heterogeneous parameters 
in λ and mean indirect utilities, δh. This estimator is based simply on maximizing the probability 
that the model correctly matches each household observed in the sample with its chosen house 
type. In particular, for any combination of the heterogeneous parameters in λ and mean indirect 
utilities, δh, the model predicts the probability that each household i chooses house type h. We 
assume that εh
i is drawn from the extreme value distribution, in which case this probability can be 
written: 
 
                                                      
20 Formally, the validity of this first stage procedure requires the assumption that the observed location 
decisions are individually optimal, given the collective choices made by other households and the vector of 
market-clearing prices and that households are sufficiently small such that they do not interact strategically 
with respect to particular draws on ε. This ensures that no household’s particular idiosyncratic preferences 
affect the equilibrium and the vector of idiosyncratic preferences ε is uncorrelated with the prices and 
neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics that arise in any equilibrium. For more discussion, see the 
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Maximizing the probability that each household makes its correct housing choice gives rise to the 
following quasi-log-likelihood function:  
 











h is an indicator variable that equals 1 if household i chooses house type h in the data and 
0 otherwise. The first stage of the estimation procedure consists of searching over the parameters 
in λ and the vector of mean indirect utilities to maximize  l
~
. Notice that the quasi-likelihood 
function developed here is based solely on the notion that each household’s residential location is 
optimal given the set of observed prices and the location decisions of other households.  
 
The Endogeneity of School Quality and Neighborhood Sociodemographic Composition. 
Having estimated the vector of mean indirect utilities in the first stage of the estimation, the 
second stage of the estimation involves decomposing δ into observable and unobservable 
components according to the regression equation (9).
21 In estimating equation (9), important 
endogeneity problems need to be confronted. To the extent that house prices partly capture house 
and neighborhood quality unobserved to the econometrician, so the price variable will be 
endogenous. Estimation via least squares will thus lead to price coefficients biased towards zero, 
producing misleading willingness-to-pay estimates for a whole range of choice characteristics. 
This issue arises in the context of any differentiated products demand estimation and we describe 
the construction of an instrument for price in the Technical Appendix.  
                                                      
21 Notice that the set of observed residential choices provides no information that distinguishes the 
components of δ. That is, however δ is broken into components, the effect on the probabilities shown in 
equation (10) is identical.   18 
 
  A second identification issue involves the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic 
characteristics Z and school quality with unobserved housing and neighborhood quality, ξh. To 
properly estimate preferences in the face of this endogeneity problem, we adapt a technique 
previously developed by Black (1999). Black’s strategy makes use of a sample of houses near 
school attendance zone boundaries, estimating a hedonic price regression that includes boundary 
fixed effects. Intuitively, the idea is to compare houses in the same local neighborhood but on 
opposite sides of the boundary, exploiting the discontinuity in the right to attend a given school.  
Differences in valuation will then reflect differences in school quality, controlling for other 
neighborhood characteristics (both observed and unobserved).    
  There are plausible reasons to think that households will sort with respect to such 
boundaries – an important theme in the work of Nechyba (1999, 2000).  Thus, while boundary 
fixed effects are likely to control well for differences in unobserved fixed factors, neighborhood 
sociodemographics are likely to vary discontinuously at the boundary. This is important.  It 
implies that boundary fixed effects isolate variation in both school quality and neighborhood 
sociodemographics in a small region in which unobserved fixed features (e.g., access to the 
transportation network) are likely to vary only slightly, thereby providing an appealing way to 
account for the correlation of both school quality and neighborhood sociodemographics with 
unobservable neighborhood quality. 
  We incorporate school district boundary fixed effects when estimating equation (11).
22 In 
particular, we create a series of indicator variables for each Census block that equal one if the 
block is within a given distance of each unique school district boundary in the metropolitan area 
(e.g., Palo Alto-Menlo Park).
23 After first describing the basic features of the dataset, we show the 
                                                      
22 While we report preference estimates based on school district boundaries below, it is important to add 
that these are qualitatively similar to those obtained in a preliminary analysis using a large sample of school 
attendance zone boundaries that we have been assembling for our sample and time period.  
23 A number of empirical issues arise in incorporating school district boundary fixed effects into our 
analysis. A central feature of local governance in California helps to eliminate some of the problems that 
naturally arise with the use of school district boundaries, as Proposition 13 ensures that the vast majority of   19 
 
variation in school quality and neighborhood sociodemographics at school district boundaries in 
the next section, drawing attention to clear discontinuities in neighborhood sociodemographics at 
the boundary. 
 
5  DATA  
The analysis conducted in this paper is facilitated by access to restricted Census 
microdata for 1990. These restricted Census data provide the detailed individual, household, and 
housing variables found in the public-use version of the Census, but also include information on 
the location of individual residences and workplaces at a very disaggregate level. In particular, 
while the public-use data specify the PUMA (a Census region with approximately 100,000 
individuals) in which a household lives, the restricted data specify the Census block (a Census 
region with approximately 100 individuals), thereby identifying the local neighborhood that each 
individual inhabits and the characteristics of each neighborhood far more accurately than has 
been previously possible with such a large-scale data set.  
We use data from six contiguous counties in the San Francisco Bay Area: Alameda, 
Contra Costa, Marin, San Mateo, San Francisco, and Santa Clara. We focus on this area for a 
number of reasons. First, this geographic area is reasonably self-contained, and is sizeable along a 
number of dimensions, including over 1,100 Census tracts, and almost 39,500 Census blocks – 
the smallest unit of aggregation in the data. The sample consists of 242,100 households.  
Very relevant for this analysis, the use of data from California makes it reasonable to use 
school district rather than school attendance zone boundaries in the analysis. In particular, 
Proposition 13 ensures that local jurisdictions have almost no discretion over property tax rates or 
the level of public good spending including school spending. In this way, unlike almost anywhere 
else in the country, one would not expect much variation in property values across school district 
                                                                                                                                                              
school districts within California are subject to a uniform effective property tax rate of one percent. 
Concerning the width of the boundaries, we experimented with a variety of distances and report the results   20 
 
boundaries to arise due to differential property tax rates in California. This same feature the 
public finance system may also diminish the overall strength of Tiebout-type sorting in 
California, as households are not free to select different tax rates and local public goods packages 
in each jurisdiction. For this reason we expect our analysis to generally understate the importance 
of school-related sorting relative to other states. 
The Census provides a wealth of data on the individuals in the sample – race, age, 
educational attainment, income from various sources, household size and structure, occupation, 
and employment location. In addition, it provides a variety of housing characteristics: whether the 
unit is owned or rented, the corresponding rent or owner-reported value,
24 number of rooms, 
number of bedrooms, type of structure, and the age of the building. We use these housing 
characteristics directly, and also construct neighborhood variables, such as neighborhood racial, 
education and income distributions, based on the households within the same Census block group 
(a Census region containing approximately 500 housing units). We merge additional data 
describing local conditions with each house record, constructing variables related to crime rates, 
land use, local schools, topography, and urban density. For each of these measures, a detailed 
description of the process by which the original data were assigned to each house is provided in a 
Data Appendix. The list of the principal housing and neighborhood variables used in the analysis, 
along with means and standard deviations, is given in the first two columns of Table 1. 
 
School Assignment and School Quality. While we have an exact assignment of Census blocks 
to school districts, in the absence of comprehensive information about within-district school 
                                                                                                                                                              
for 0.25 miles, as these were more precise due to the larger sample size. 
24 As described in the Data Appendix, we construct a single price vector for all houses, whether rented or 
owned. Because the implied relationship between house values and current rents depends on expectations 
about the growth rate of future rents in the market, we estimate a series of hedonic price regressions for 
each of over 40 sub-regions of the Bay Area housing market. These regressions return an estimate of the 
ratio of house values to rents for each of these sub-regions and we use the average of these ratios for the 
Bay Area, 264.1, to convert monthly rent to house value for the purposes of reporting results at the mean.   21 
 
attendance areas,
25 we employ the following approach for linking each Census block to a school: 
For a given Census block, we calculate the distance to each school in its district. We then first 
assign the Census block to the closest school within its district. Using this closest school 
assignment, we can then calculate a predicted enrollment for each school (calculated by summing 
over the school-aged children in each Census block assigned to a school) and compare this 
measure to the actual enrollment of the school. To correct discrepancies in predicted versus actual 
enrollment, we then use an intuitive procedure to adjust the assignment of Census blocks to 
schools so as to ensure that predicted enrollments equal their actual counterparts in each school in 
each district. We describe this procedure in detail in the Data Appendix; the results are not 
sensitive to this adjustment. 
  As our measure of school quality, we use the average test score for each school, averaged 
over two years. Averaging helps to reduce any year-to-year noise in the measure. When variables 
that characterize the sociodemographic composition of the school or surrounding neighborhood 
are included in the analysis, the estimated coefficient on average test score picks up what 
households are willing to pay for an improvement in average student performance at a school, 
holding the sociodemographic composition constant. While the average test score is an imperfect 
measure of school quality, it has the advantage of being easily observed by both parents and 
researchers and consequently has been used in most analyses that attempt to measure demand for 
school quality.  
 
Boundaries. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for various samples related to the boundaries. 
The first two columns report means and standard deviations for the full sample while the third 
                                                      
25 The preference estimates based on school district boundaries reported below are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained in a preliminary analysis using a large sample of school attendance zone boundaries that we 
have been assembling for our sample and time period.    22 
 
column reports means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a school district boundary.
26 
Comparing the first column to the third column of the table, it is immediately obvious that the 
houses near school district boundaries are not fully representative of those in the Bay Area as a 
whole. To address this problem, we create sample weights for the houses near the boundary.
27 
Column 7 of Table 1 shows the resulting weighted means, indicating that using these weights 
makes the sample near the boundary much more representative of the full sample. 
  The fourth and fifth columns report means for houses within 0.25 miles of a boundary, 
comparing houses on the high versus low average test score side of the each boundary; the sixth 
column reports t-tests for the difference in means. Comparing these differences reveals that 
houses on the high side cost $53 more per month and are assigned to schools with test scores that 
are 43-point higher on average.
28 Moreover, houses on the high quality side of the boundary are 
much more likely to be inhabited by white households and households with more education and 
income. These types of across-boundary differences in sociodemographic composition are what 
one would expect if households sort on the basis of preferences for school quality. While far less 
significant, other housing characteristics do vary across the boundaries as well. Consequently, we 
expect the use of boundary fixed effects to control for much of the variation in unobserved 
housing and neighborhood quality, thereby giving rise to more accurate estimates of preferences 
for neighborhood sociodemographics and school quality.  
 
 
                                                      
26 We experimented with a variety of distances and report the results for 0.25 miles, as these were more 
precise due to the larger sample size.  
27 The following procedure is used: we first regress a dummy variable indicating whether a house is in a 
boundary region on the vector of housing and neighborhood attributes using a logistic regression. Fitted 
values from this regression provide an estimate of the likelihood that a house is in the boundary region 
given its attributes. We use the inverse of this fitted value as a sample weight in subsequent regression 
analysis conducted on the sample of houses near the boundary. 
28 As described in the Data Appendix, we construct a single monthly price vector for all houses, whether 
rented or owned.    23 
 
6  DEMAND ESTIMATES 
  We noted in Section 3 that estimation of the full model proceeds in two stages. The first 
stage recovers interaction parameters and a vector of mean indirect utilities; the second stage 
returns the components of mean indirect utility. To give the reader a sense of the interplay 
between the estimates of the demand for school quality and sociodemographic characteristics of 
neighbors, we report results for two main specifications, which respectively exclude and include 
variables that characterize the racial composition, average educational attainment, and average 
income of the neighborhood (Census block group). To make the discussion of these estimates 
more transparent, we transform the estimates so that they can be described in terms of marginal 
willingness-to-pay measures (MWTP), reporting these estimates in Tables 2-4.  
  Table 2 reports the implied measures of the mean MWTP for school average test scores 
and other selected housing and neighborhood attributes for six specifications of the mean indirect 
utility regression.
29 Results are reported for the two main specifications, which exclude and 
include neighborhood sociodemographic variables, respectively. For each of these main 
specifications, results are reported for the full sample and for a sample of houses within 0.25 
miles of school district boundaries, with and without including boundary fixed effects. In all 
cases, when the sample of houses is restricted to those within 0.25 miles of a boundary, sample 
weights (as described in Section 5) are used in order to make this sample as close to 
representative of the full sample as possible. Comparing columns 1 and 2 or columns 4 and 5, it is 
clear that results are very similar whether the full sample or the weighted sub-sample of houses 
near a school district boundary is used. 
The first three columns of Table 2 report results for specifications that exclude 
neighborhood sociodemographics. In this case, the estimated mean MWTP for a one standard 
deviation increase in school average test score declines from $123 to $82 in monthly rent   24 
 
($21,500 in house value) when boundary fixed effects are included in the analysis. The final three 
columns report results for analogous specifications that include neighborhood sociodemographic 
characteristics. The coefficient on the average test score in these specifications returns the 
average of what households are willing to pay for a standard deviation increase in the average test 
score conditional on the sociodemographic characteristics of the neighborhood, which are also 
indicative of the sociodemographic characteristics of the local school. The estimated MWTP for a 
one standard deviation increase in the average test score in this case declines to $26 in monthly 
rent ($6,900 in house value), which is approximately 2.4 percent of the average house price index 
for our Bay Area sample.
30  
These results make clear that much of what initially appears in the specification without 
neighborhood sociodemographics to be a significant willingness on the part of households to pay 
for school quality is instead more properly attributed to the characteristics of neighbors or peers. 
That the resulting MWTP for school average test scores is relatively small is exactly what one 
would expect if households have difficulty inferring the quality of a school from published 
average test score data.
31 That is, one would expect households to place a relatively small weight 
on this measure when choosing neighborhoods if the signal that the published average test score 
provided about actual school quality was small relative to the noise that it contains related to 
differences in the underlying composition of individuals taking the test. In fact, some of the 
weight that parents place directly on neighborhood sociodemographics may result from a belief 
that these provide a better indication than the test score of the quality of the education that their 
children will receive in the local schools, especially if parents perceive peer effects to be 
important.  
                                                                                                                                                              
29 The specifications of the mean indirect utility regressions are reported in Appendix Table 1. The mean 
MWTP measures reported in Table 2 are calculated by dividing the coefficient associated with each choice 
characteristic by the coefficient on price. 
30 This is very similar to the estimates of Black (1999) and Kane, Staiger, and Riegg (2004). 
31 This is especially true in 1990, which pre-dates most concerted efforts on the part of states to provide 
information to households about the quality of the local school.   25 
 
Before turning to the results related to heterogeneity in preferences, it is important to 
point out that the final two columns of Table 2 also show the impact of including boundary fixed 
effects on the estimates of mean preferences for neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics. 
Comparing these columns reveals the pattern of results that one would expect if boundary fixed 
effects control in part for unobserved neighborhood quality and unobserved quality is positively 
correlated with neighborhood income and education and negatively correlated with the fraction of 
non-white households.
32 Thus boundary fixed effects seem to be effective in controlling for fixed 
aspects of unobserved neighborhood quality that are correlated with neighborhood 
sociodemographics, and thus provide an attractive way of estimating preferences for both school 
quality  and neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics in the presence of this important 
endogeneity problem. 
  
Heterogeneity in Willingness-to-Pay 
  The interaction parameters estimated in the first stage for the specifications that exclude 
and include neighborhood sociodemographics, respectively, are reported in Appendix Tables 2 
and 3. These specifications correspond to the mean MWTP estimates reported in columns 3 and 6 
of Table 2, respectively. In each case, the model controls simultaneously for the effect of each of 
a series of household characteristics (income, education, race, work status, age, and household 
structure) on the marginal willingness-to-pay for a variety of housing and neighborhood 
attributes, including the average test score of the local school. The model also captures the spatial 
                                                      
32 The fact that the estimated coefficient on the average test score rises from $20 to $26 when boundary 
fixed effects are included reflects that fact it is positively correlated with neighborhood income and 
education and negatively correlated with the fraction of non-white households. Thus, the estimated 
coefficient on the average test score tends to rise as the coefficients on these other variables change, as they 
do in moving from column 5 to column 6 in Table 2.   26 
 
aspect of the housing market by allowing households to have preferences over commuting 
distance.
33   
  Table 3 converts the estimates of the heterogeneity in MWTP for the average test score 
into dollar terms. The two columns of the table report results for specifications that exclude and 
include neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics, respectively. Thus the first row of this 
table reports the estimated mean MWTP for the change listed in each column heading: for 
example, the first entry reports the $82 mean MWTP for a one standard deviation increase in the 
average test score, conditional on neighborhood sociodemographics initially reported in column 3 
of Table 2. The remaining rows report the difference in MWTP associated with the comparison of 
household characteristics shown in the row heading, the second row showing how a household’s 
MWTP changes with an increase of $100,000 in income.    
  Analogous to the effect of including neighborhood sociodemographic variables on the 
estimates of the mean MWTP reported in Table 2, including these variables decreases the 
magnitude of the estimated heterogeneity in demand for school quality, decreasing the coefficient 
associated with household income by 60 percent, with education by 75 percent, and with race 
(which may proxy in part for wealth) by upwards of 80 percent. The estimates of the specification 
that includes neighborhood sociodemographics also return the expected positive additional 
MWTP associated with the presence of school-aged children. Table 4 reports analogous measures 
of the heterogeneity in MWTP for selected housing and neighborhood attributes when including 
neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics.  This reveals, for example, that increases in 
household income are typically associated with large increases in the demand for housing 
attributes, and that college-educated households are willing to pay a substantial premium relative 
to less-educated households to live with more educated neighbors. Specifically, they are willing 
                                                      
33 We treat a household’s primary work location as exogenous, calculating the distance from this location to 
the location of the neighborhood in question. MWTP estimates for other housing and neighborhood 
attributes based on a specification without commuting distance are qualitatively similar except for variables 
that are strongly correlated with employment access, such as population density.   27 
 
to pay around $59 per month more than less-educated households for a 10 percent increase in 
college-educated neighbors. Not surprisingly, strong racial interactions are also at work in the 
housing market, leading to significant sorting along this dimension as well.
34 
 
Constructing Measures of the Residual Elasticity of Demand Faced by Each School 
  Given the estimates of the demand system, we now calculate a measure of the residual 
elasticity faced by each school. For each of 708 elementary schools in the Bay Area, we use the 
equilibrium model to conduct a simple counterfactual simulation, raising each school’s average 
test score by a 0.1 standard deviation (7.76 points on a mean of 522) and then calculating the new 
housing market equilibrium. In every case, this has the effect of increasing house values in the 
corresponding neighborhood catchment area. The elasticity measure that we use in the subsequent 
analysis consists of the estimated change in average local property values per standard deviation 
increase in test score. Across the 708 elementary schools, the corresponding increase in house 
values following this increase ranges from $1,400 to $19,600 ($5-$80 in monthly house price), 
with a mean of $11,800 ($45.5) and a standard deviation of $3,200 ($12.4).
35  
  Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of the estimated elasticities across the Bay 
Area. In the figure, the area of the circle indicates the magnitude of the estimated elasticity. In 
general, a school’s elasticity of demand (as measured by the gradient of house values with respect 
to school quality) will be a function of two features of its environment: (i) the willingness of the 
                                                      
34 Note that the strength of the estimated racial interactions reported in Table 4 may reflect the presence of 
centralized discriminatory practices in the market in addition to the direct preferences of households to live 
with others of the same race. See Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2005) for more discussion of this issue. 
35 The basic structure of the computation of the new equilibrium consists of a loop within a loop. Having 
lowered the test score of a given school by a standard deviation, we first calculate a new set of prices that 
clears the market; Berry (1994) ensures that there is a unique set of market clearing prices up to scale. 
Using these new prices and the initial sociodemographic composition of each neighborhood, we calculate 
the probability that each household chooses each housing type, and aggregating these choices to the 
neighborhood level, the corresponding predicted sociodemographic composition of each neighborhood. We 
replace the initial neighborhood sociodemographic measures with these new measures and start the loop 
again – i.e., calculate a new set of market clearing prices with these updated neighborhood 
sociodemographic measures. We continue this process until the neighborhood sociodemographic measures   28 
 
households that it serves to pay for improvements in school quality, and (ii) the availability of 
close substitutes in geographically proximate neighborhoods. The former type of variation in the 
elasticity measure is problematic from the point of view of estimating the productive effect of 
competition in that a household’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for school quality is likely to be 
correlated with the performance of its children on standardized tests for reasons that have nothing 
to do with the school itself. The latter form of variation is much less problematic in that a school 
and its corresponding neighborhood in any quality range can be located such that it has either 
many similar or dissimilar neighboring school catchment areas. It is this latter form of variation 
that we would like to exploit in our analysis. 
  Looking directly at the model of residential sorting estimated above, it is clear that the 
household sociodemographic characteristics included in the model, such as parental education, 
increase a household’s estimated WTP for school quality and therefore increase the estimated 
elasticity of demand for schools that serve these households. Thus in every specification of the 
analysis that follows, we include a complete set of controls for neighborhood averages of all the 
household sociodemographic and other housing and neighborhood measures included in our 
demand estimation. Without including this full set of controls, the elasticity measure would be 
mechanically correlated with the average school test score: because highly educated households 
are willing to pay more for school quality and select in to schools with higher test scores, the 
elasticity of demand for these schools is mechanically greater. When this full set of controls is 
included in estimating our main regression equations, however, this mechanical correlation is 
eliminated; doing so has the effect of reducing the effective variation in our main elasticity 
measure to the variation related to the availability of close substitutes in the local market. 
  Figure 2 shows the geographic distribution of the remaining variation in the estimated 
elasticities across the Bay Area once the full set of sociodemographic and other housing and 
                                                                                                                                                              
converge. The household location decisions corresponding to the final sociodemographic measures along 
with the vector of housing prices that clears the market then represents the new equilibrium.   29 
 
neighborhood attributes included in the demand model have been conditioned out (i.e., the 
residual from a regression of our elasticity measure on this complete set of controls). For those 
familiar with the Bay Area, even a quick glance comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2 reveals that the 
remaining variation in the elasticity measure is not a simply a function of neighborhood 
socioeconomic conditions. For expositional ease, we work with a standardized version of this 
conditional elasticity measure throughout the remainder of our analysis. (Means and standard 
deviations for the school-related variables summarized for the 708 elementary schools used in the 
subsequent analysis are shown in Table 5.)   
  To demonstrate that the variation in these conditional elasticity measures is indeed related 
to the notion of the proximity of close substitutes, we construct a series of dissimilarity indices 
based on average house prices, neighborhood income, and neighborhood education. Using the 
neighborhood catchment areas for the nearest 10 schools, we construct a measure of the average 
absolute difference between the measure of the school in question and each of these neighbors. 
Thus a high measure for a given dissimilarity index indicates that a school is quite distinct from 
its geographic neighbors in the corresponding dimension (e.g., price, income, education).
36  
  These dissimilarity indices provide a simple (albeit crude) measure of the availability of 
close substitute neighborhoods in the local market. Table 6 shows the correlation between these 
dissimilarity indices and our conditional elasticity measure (once the full set of 
sociodemographic, housing, and other neighborhood measures used in estimating the demand 
model have been conditioned out). In each case, the correlation is negative, indicating that 
schools that are differentiated from their neighbors in terms of sociodemographic and housing 
characteristics tend to have lower elasticities ceteris paribus. This suggests that the remaining 
                                                      
36 The point of this exercise is not to suggest that the set of the 10 closest neighboring schools necessarily 
contains a school’s closest substitutes. High quality schools separated by large distances may be closer 
substitutes for one another than a high quality and low quality pair of neighboring schools. We use this 
measure primarily to show that our estimated elasticity measure is correlated with a clear measure of the 
availability of close substitutes, acknowledging that this constructed measure is not itself a perfect proxy.    30 
 
variation in our elasticity measure is indeed picking up the type of variation that we would like to 
exploit in estimating equation (1).  
  Finally, to demonstrate that our conditional elasticity measures are based on variation in 
the data driven by the geography of the Bay Area rather than the types of households in the local 
neighborhood, we conducted the following diagnostic test. First, we re-calculated an estimate of 
the residual elasticity of demand using a model of residential sorting that did not include distance 
to work (i.e., a model that ignored geography). We then included these alternate elasticities in 
average test score regressions analogous regressions to those reported below in Table 7.  In each 
case, the coefficients on the demand elasticity were essentially zero and statistically insignificant. 
This diagnostic test gives us confidence that any mechanical correlation associated with the 
increased willingness of some households to pay for school quality (e.g., highly-educated) is 
eliminated by the inclusion of a full set of controls for the variables used in the demand 
estimation. It also makes clear the importance of including geography in the demand estimation; 
it is the notion of the availability of close substitutes in geographic space that forms the basis for 
the remaining variation in our elasticity measures.
37  
 
7  SUPPLY-SIDE REGRESSIONS 
We now turn to our main regression analysis. In particular, we report results for the 
specification shown in equation (1) using a variety of school characteristics (output and input) as 
the dependent variable and a series of six distinct sets of control variables. (The variables 
included in each set of control variables are listed in Appendix Table 4.)  
Table 7 reports results when the average 4
th grade test score is used as the dependent 
variable. As mentioned above, because we are using the conditional elasticity measure (the 
                                                      
37 Finally, it is worth noting that by construction our elasticity measures are complex functions of 
observable household and neighborhood variables including location. In this way, they are generally 
insulated against bias that might normally come about due to the correlation of unobserved ability and   31 
 
residual from a regression of the elasticity on a complete set of controls for the neighborhood 
average of all household sociodemographic, housing, and other neighborhood variables used in 
estimating the demand side of our mode). This amounts to including this complete set of controls 
in all specifications reported in Table 7.  
The first column of Table 7 includes only these variables as controls. The second column 
adds seventeen additional controls for 4
th grade school sociodemographics. These are included to 
account for the fact that the sociodemographic characteristics of the students in the school 
(important in the production of the test score) might differ from the neighborhood average 
sociodemographics. The third column adds controls for five measures of the employment access 
by education level as well as four direct geographic measures. These controls are included to 
account for the possibility that the households who live within the core of the Bay Area may be 
systematically different than those who live in outlying regions.
38 A full set of parameter 
estimates for the specification shown in the third column are shown in Appendix Table 5. The 
fourth column adds controls for interactions between neighborhood race, education and income 
measures. This ensures that the remaining variation in the elasticity measure is not an artifact of 
non-linearities in these important household sociodemographics. Column five adds higher-order 
house price and income terms, and finally, column six adds four local land-use measures.  
The estimates reported in the six columns of Table 7 reveal a consistent pattern of results 
with the conditional elasticity coefficient estimate falling in the range of 8.6-12.8 and the t-
statistic ranging between 3.0 and 4.0. These coefficients are reported for a standardized 
conditional elasticity measure and thus the interpretation is that a one standard deviation increase 
in the competitiveness of a school’s local environment within the Bay Area is associated with a 
10-12 point increase in the average test score of the school – about 0.15 standard deviations. This 
                                                                                                                                                              
unobserved demand on the part of parents; our elasticity measures are constructed so as to avoid including 
this portion of the variation in the measures.  
38 It is also worth noting that the inclusion of county fixed effects also does not affect the results.   32 
 
is a sizeable effect, indicating that a school’s performance is indeed strongly linked to the 
competitiveness of its local environment.   
We use a specification corresponding to the third column of Table 7 for the remaining 
analysis conducted in the paper. The first six columns of Table 8 report a series of such 
regressions using various school input measures as the dependent variable. The first three 
columns relate to teacher experience and reveal that schools facing a greater elasticity of demand 
actually have significantly fewer of the most productive teachers (those with experience between 
5-9 years) and tend to have a higher number of teachers who are just beginning and nearing the 
end of their careers. The point estimates for the effect of the elasticity on the dependent variables 
considered in the next three columns, the pupil-teacher ratio and teacher education variables, are 
highly insignificant and very small in magnitude. Thus, in general, schools facing a higher 
elasticity of demand appear to produce higher test scores without any significant advantages in 
terms of observable school inputs.  
As discussed above, that school input decisions are not strongly related to the conditional 
elasticity of demand in the Bay Area is not especially surprising given the restrictive financing 
regime in place in California. The fact that schools facing greater amounts of local competitive 
pressures do not attract observably better teachers provides some assurance that the remaining 
variation in our elasticity measure is not simply picking up unobserved student or neighborhood 
characteristics. Because teachers can sort across schools, we might be worried, for example, if a 
higher residual demand elasticity was correlated with the presence of more experienced or better-
educated teachers. If anything, it appears that increased competition may push better teachers 
away from a school, perhaps because competition is associated with more intense monitoring.  
The final column of Table 8 provides another way to evaluate the possibility that the 
conditional elasticity measure is correlated with unobserved student/household characteristics. In 
particular, column 7 reports the results for a specification that uses the average amount of income 
from capital sources in the corresponding neighborhood (the best proxy for wealth available in   33 
 
the Census) as the dependent variable. Importantly, this measure was not used in estimating the 
demand side of the model and therefore serves as an appropriate test of whether the remaining 
variation in our elasticity measure proxies for the type of unobserved household characteristic 
that might be expected to positively affect test scores. As the results reveal, the point estimate is 
actually negative in this case (with a t-statistic of -1.3), indicating that higher elasticity schools 
actually serve households with lower levels of capital income ceteris paribus. This evidence 
provides a further indication that the remaining variation in our elasticity measure is not simply 
proxying for unobserved household characteristics.  
  In the final two tables of the paper, we explore the relationship between the dissimilarity 
indices described above and the average 4
th grade test score. Again, it is this type of variation in 
our elasticity measure that we would ideally like to exploit in estimating the main specification 
shown in Tables 7 and 8, although it is again important to remember that these dissimilarity 
indices provide only a crude measure of the availability of close substitutes that our elasticity 
measures are capturing.  
  Table 9 reports the results of a series of specifications that relate the standardized school 
elasticity measure to various dissimilarity indices and additional control variables. Not 
surprisingly, given the negative correlations in Table 6, these measures are negatively related to 
the elasticity measure and are significant in most cases. When various combinations of these 
dissimilarity measures are included directly in the average 4
th grade test score regression in Table 
10, they collectively enter negatively and significantly. This lends further support to the view that 
the positive coefficient estimates reported in Table 7 are in fact reasonable.  Schools increasingly 
isolated in product space (relative to their ten closest geographic neighbors) perform significantly 
worse.   
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8  CONCLUSION 
Numerous studies have addressed the policy-relevant question of whether greater choice 
will lead to improvements in school quality. The typical focus in the prior literature has been on 
the overall effect of increased choice on school performance.  
In the current paper, we began with the observation that this overall effect can be 
decomposed into a component measuring demand responsiveness (how increased choice affects 
school competition) and a second component measuring supply responsiveness (the way that 
increased competition affects school performance). By focusing on the overall effect of choice, 
the previous literature has provided little guidance as to the effect of competition itself on school 
performance. Moreover, existing research suggests that the responsiveness of demand to 
increased choice may be weak, leaving open the possibility that supply responsiveness may be 
altogether more powerful.  
This paper then presented a new approach for measuring the direct effect of competition 
on school performance – the strength of supply responsiveness. Central to this approach is the 
construction of a residual elasticity of demand for each school – our preferred measure of local 
competition – which captures the change in demand each school faces in response to a change in 
that school’s quality. We do so using a flexible demand model, estimated using very rich Census 
data. This competition measure is then used in a regression framework that relates measured 
school performance to student, school and neighborhood controls, including the competition 
measure. 
Our results provide the first estimates in the literature of the direct effect of increased 
competition on public school performance. We find evidence of a marked increase in test scores 
in response to an increase in the residual elasticity of demand: a one standard deviation increase 
in the competitiveness of a school’s local market within the Bay Area is associated with a 0.15 
standard deviation increase in school performance. At the same time, these achievement increases   35 
 
are accompanied by, if anything, slight reductions in important inputs, helping allay concerns 
about the role of omitted variables in these regressions.  
These findings are robust to inclusion of many types of control.  We show that our 
residual elasticity has no effect in predicting neighborhood wealth, lending support to the notion 
that our preferred competition measure is not simply picking up unobserved household 
characteristics.  In contrast, it is correlated with similarity indices that describe the extent to 
which a school is isolated geographically (and in terms of product space): the residual elasticities 
increase the less isolated a school becomes. As one might expect, these similarity measures also 
have positive effect on school performance.  In terms of heterogeneous effects, we find that 
school responsiveness to increased competition is greater in more educated communities, 
suggesting that educated parents may be better able to monitor school personnel as competition 
increases.  
Overall, our evidence is consistent with strong supply responsiveness on the part of 
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Silicon ValleyTable 1. Full Sample, and School District Boundary Sub-Sample
Sample full sample
Boundary/Weights actual sample high test score side* low test score side* t-test for weighted sample
Observations 27,958 13,348 14,610 difference in 27,958
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) means (6)
Mean S.D. Mean Mean Mean ((4) versus (5)) Mean
Housing/Neighborhood Characteristics
monthly house price 1,087 755 1,130 1,158 1,105 5.71 1,098
average test score 527 74 536 558 515 50.96 529
1 if unit owned 0.597 0.491 0.629 0.632 0.626 1.04 0.616
number of rooms 5.114 1.992 5.170 5.207 5.134 3.13 5.180
1 if built in 1980s 0.143 0.350 0.108 0.118 0.099 5.09 0.148
1 if built in 1960s or 1970s 0.391 0.488 0.424 0.412 0.437 4.22 0.406
elevation 210 179 193 194 192 1.14 212
population density 0.434 0.497 0.352 0.349 0.355 2.08 0.374
crime index 8.184 10.777 6.100 6.000 6.192 2.36 7.000
% Census block group white 0.681 0.232 0.704 0.712 0.686 4.69 0.676
% Census block group black 0.081 0.159 0.071 0.065 0.076 3.01 0.080
% Census block group Hispanic 0.110 0.114 0.113 0.107 0.119 4.56 0.117
% Census block group Asian 0.122 0.120 0.112 0.110 0.113 1.12 0.121
% block group college degree or more 0.438 0.196 0.457 0.463 0.451 2.89 0.433
average block group income 54,744 26,075 57,039 58,771 55,457 4.65 55,262
Household Characteristics
household income 54,103 50,719 56,663 58,041 55,405 4.20 55,498
1 if children under 18 in household 0.333 0.471 0.324 0.322 0.325 0.54 0.336
1 if black 0.076 0.264 0.066 0.062 0.070 2.69 0.076
1 if Hispanic 0.109 0.312 0.111 0.102 0.119 4.54 0.115
1 if Asian 0.124 0.329 0.112 0.114 0.110 1.06 0.121
1 if white 0.686 0.464 0.706 0.717 0.696 3.86 0.682
1 if less than high school 0.154 0.361 0.141 0.134 0.147 3.12 0.152
1 if high school 0.184 0.388 0.176 0.177 0.175 0.44 0.183
1 if some college 0.223 0.417 0.222 0.222 0.223 0.20 0.225
1 if college degree 0.291 0.454 0.294 0.295 0.294 0.18 0.286
1 if more than college 0.147 0.354 0.166 0.172 0.161 2.46 0.155
age (years) 47.607 16.619 47.890 48.104 47.699 1.99 47.660
1 if working 0.698 0.459 0.705 0.702 0.709 1.28 0.701
distance to work (miles) 8.843 8.597 8.450 8.412 8.492 0.82 8.490
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean and standard deviation for keyvariables for the full sample. Column 3 reports means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a school district
boundary. Columns 4 and 5 report means on the high versus low test score side of boundaries. Column 6 provides a t-statistic for a test of whether the means reported in columns 4 and 5
are equal. Column 7 reports weighted means for the sample of houses within 0.25 miles of a school district boundary. Weights are constructed so as to make the boundary sample more
representative of the full sample and are described in the main text. In constructing columns 4 and 5, we assign each house in the full sample to the nearest school district boundary, noting
whether its local school has a higher test score than the school associated with the closest Census block on the other side of the boundary.
within 0.25 miles of boundaries




average test score (in standard deviations)
1 if unit owned
number of rooms
1 if built in 1980s




% Census block group black
% Census block group Hispanic
% Census block group Asian
% block group college degree or more
average block group income
F-statistic for boundary fixed effects
Note: Specifications shown in the table also include controls for land use (% industrial, % residential, % commercial, % open space, % other) in 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5 mile rings around location and six variables that characterize the housing stock in each of these rings. MWTP measures are reported in terms of a
monthly house price.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Without Neighborhood Sociodemographics With Neighborhood Sociodemographics




































































































































(5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4)Without Neighborhood With Neighborhood
Sociodemographics in Model Sociodemographics in Model
Mean MWTP 81.53 26.22
(7.72) (6.13)
Heterogeneity in MWTP
Household Income (+$100,000) 40.45 15.66
(0.28) (0.35)
Children Under 18 vs. -11.90 7.10
No Children (3.07) (3.78)
Black vs. White -93.84 -18.05
(5.15) (7.50)
Hispanic vs. White -40.75 -4.64
(4.64) (5.80)
Asian vs. White -9.08 5.79
(3.99) (5.08)
College Degree or More vs. 57.65 14.12
Some College or Less (3.46) (4.24)
Householder Working vs. 1.91 6.63
Not Working (3.16) (4.02)
Age (+10 years) 1.02 0.86
(0.09) (0.11)
Note: The first row of the table reports the mean marginal willingness-to-pay for the change reported in the column
heading. The remaining rows report the difference in willingness to pay associated with the change listed in the row
heading, holding all other factors equal.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3. Heterogeneity in Marginal Willingness to Pay for School Average Test Score
One Standard Deviation Increase in Average Test ScoreSpecification Includes Neighborhood Sociodemographic Charactersitics
Own vs. Rent +1 Room Built in 1980s +10% Black vs. +10% Hisp vs. +10% Asian vs. +10% College Blk Group
vs. pre-1960 White White White Educated Avg Income
+ $10,000
Mean MWTP 161.05 118.93 95.55 -26.71 13.90 15.53 13.77 87.61
(9.24) (4.40) (11.84) (3.98) (6.31) (5.57) (4.45) (4.00)
Household Income (+$100,000) 218.37 61.19 105.07 -15.32 7.73 -0.50 26.17 15.44
(7.13) (1.70) (7.62) (3.89) (4.13) (2.54) (2.18) (1.13)
Children Under 18 vs. -12.87 40.06 -24.52 10.38 15.03 12.17 -14.18 5.05
No Children (6.67) (1.80) (7.94) (2.70) (3.41) (2.51) (2.15) (1.06)
Black vs. White -63.55 1.56 2.95 96.82 46.13 48.02 16.99 -0.45
(13.25) (3.40) (16.38) (3.62) (5.75) (4.84) (4.40) (2.27)
Hispanic vs. White -6.44 -14.14 -8.07 28.89 81.36 18.01 5.43 2.07
(9.53) (2.63) (12.00) (3.68) (4.01) (3.81) (3.19) (1.41)
Asian vs. White 113.65 -32.92 43.94 27.74 21.95 92.49 -0.05 1.99
(8.96) (2.27) (10.77) (3.64) (4.67) (2.78) (2.91) (1.41)
College Degree or More vs. 33.83 4.50 42.06 8.34 -4.16 -12.70 59.29 3.66
Some College or Less (7.67) (2.05) (9.57) (3.27) (3.94) (2.91) (2.37) (1.29)
Householder Working vs. 42.72 3.69 60.60 -4.71 -2.17 -2.81 -12.62 3.88
Not Working (7.31) (1.94) (8.92) (2.88) (3.65) (2.82) (2.27) (1.04)
Age (+10 years) 6.49 0.30 -2.07 -0.15 -0.56 -0.03 -0.12 0.11
(0.21) (0.06) (0.25) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03)
Note: The first row of the table reports the mean marginal willingness-to-payfor the change reported in the column heading. The remaining rows report the difference in willingnessto pay associated with the
change listed in the row heading, holding all other factors equal.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
House Characteristics Neighborhood Sociodemographics
Table 4. Heterogeneity in Marginal Willingness to Pay for Select Housing and Neighborhood AttributesTable 5 - Summary Statistics for School-Related Variables (N=708)
Variable Description Mean Std Dev
School Characteristics
Residual Elasticity Measure 45.53 12.37
Average 4th grade test score 522.27 77.62
Proportion of teachers with 0-4 years experience 19.63 13.29
Proportion of teachers with 5-9 years experience  14.90 10.09
Proportion of teachers with more than 10 years experience  65.46 17.02
Pupil teacher ratio 23.98 3.09
Proportion of teachers with Max B.A. or less  9.53 12.81
Proportion of teachers with Min M.A. or more 26.28 13.92
4th Grade School Sociodemographics
% AFDC  14.87 15.95
% Moved in Past Year  16.09 10.34
% Asian 14.70 17.49
% Black 13.50 22.34
% Hispanic 22.13 24.62
% White or Other Race 49.66 36.79
% Parent Educ Category  1 23.59 21.62
% Parent Educ Category  2 20.01 11.32
% Parent Educ Category  3 29.08 15.76
% Parent Educ Category  4 13.59 14.52
% Parent Educ Category  5 6.84 12.72
% Parent Educ Category  6 2.46 5.10
% Parent Educ Category  7 4.42 11.08
% Parent Language Category 1 72.44 21.36
% Parent Language Category 2 17.35 14.59
% Parent Language Category 3 10.23 13.48
% Parent Language Category 4 3.56 7.83
School Dissimilarity Indices
avg diff btwn average income in school catchment area vs the 10 closest schools 9677.34 11018.11
avg diff btwn proportion of householders with higher ed in school catchment area vs the 10 closes 0.077 0.064
avg diff btwn average number of rooms in school catchment area vs the 10 closest schools. 0.54 0.43
avg diff btwn proportion of home owners in school catchment area vs the 10 closest schools. 0.12 0.09
avg diff btwn average monthly housing price in school catchment area vs the 10 closest schools 204.78 238.07
Note: This table reports means and standard deviations for school-related variables summairzed for the 708 schools used in the subsequent analysis.Table 6 - Correlation Matrix Conditional Elasticity Measure and Dissimilarity Indices
Obs=708
Cond. Elasticity D10 - Income  D10 - Education D10 - Rooms D10 - Ownership D10 - Price
Conditional Elasticity 1.000
D10 - Income  -0.069 1.000
D10 - Education -0.086 0.510 1.000
D10 - Rooms -0.111 0.681 0.374 1.000
D10 - Ownership -0.098 0.427 0.249 0.716 1.000
D10 - Price -0.138 0.859 0.485 0.649 0.393 1.000
D10 - Income  dissimilarity index: avg. absolute diff. between average income in school catchment area vs. the 10 closest schools.
D10 - Education dissimilarity index: avg. absolute diff. between % householders with higher education in school catchment area vs. the 10 closest scho
D10 - Rooms dissimilarity index: avg. absolute diff. between average number of rooms in school catchment area vs. the 10 closest schools.
D10 - Ownership dissimilarity index: avg. absolute diff. between proportion of home owners in school catchment area vs. the 10 closest schools.
D10 - Price dissimilarity index: avg. absolute diff. between average monthly housing price in school catchment area vs. the 10 closest schools.
Note: The conditional elasticity measure used in this table is the residual from a regression of the actual elasticity measure on the full set of sociodemographic, school, housing, and neighborhood 
controls used in column 3 in Table 7.  This table summarizes the correlation between this conditional elasticity measure and five dissimilarity indices that measure the average absolute difference 
between the measure associated with a given school and those of the ten nearest schools.Table 7 - Regressions of Test Score on School Elasticity Measure with Control Variables 
Dependent Variable
St. Dev. of Dep. Var.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Standardized Conditional Elasticity Measure 12.839 8.637 9.651 10.826 11.649 11.696
(St. Dev. = 1.0) (3.312) (2.952) (3.256) (3.468) (3.929) (3.926)
Control Variables Included in Specification
Neighborhood Sociodemographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Sociodemographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment Access and Geographic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Neighborhood Race-Education-Income Interactions Yes Yes Yes
Higher-Order House Value and Income Terms Yes Yes
Land-Use Variables Yes
Obs
R2 0.703 0.788 0.793 0.805 0.807 0.807
Note: This table reports the results of six specifications of a regression of the average 4th grade test score on the standardized elasticity measure and seven sets of control 
variables.  The variables included in each set of controls variables are listed in Appendix Table 4.  The complete results for the specification reported in the third column are 
shown in Appendix Table 5.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Average 4th Grade Test Score
708 708
77.62
708 708 708 708Table 8 - Regressions of School and Neighborhood Characteristics on Elasticity Measure with Control Variables 
Dependent Variable % Teachers % Teachers % Teachers
<5 years exp. 5-9 years exp. >= 10 years exp. Ratio Max BA Min MA Income (/10.000)
St. Dev. Dependent Variable 13.29 10.09 17.02 3.09 12.81 13.92
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Standardized Conditional Elasticity Measure 1.033 -2.477 1.444 0.055 -0.071 -0.055 -0.398
(St. Dev. = 1.0) (0.857) (0.853) (1.217) (0.180) (0.602) (0.721) (0.316)
Control Variables Included in Specification
Neighborhood Sociodemographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Housing and Neighborhood Chars. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Sociodemographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment Access and Geographic Vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs
R
2 0.160 0.186 0.199 0.188 0.217 0.293 0.834
% Teachers w/ % Teachers w/
Note: This table reports the results of seven specifications of a regression of various school inputs and neighborhood capital income on the standardized elasticity measure and four sets of control variables.  The variables included in each
set of controls variables are listed in Appendix Table 4.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
708 708 708
Avg. N'hood Capital
708 708 708 708
Pupil-TeacherTable 9 - Regressions of Elasticity Measure on Control Variables and Dissimilarity Measures
Dependent Variable
St. Dev. of Dep. Var.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighborhood Income Dissimilarity Index (/10,000) -0.108 0.208
(St. Dev. = 1.102 ) (0.079) (0.225)
House Price Dissimilarity Index (/100) -0.100 -0.172
(St. Dev. = 2.381 ) (0.023) (0.099)
Neighborhood Education Dissimilarity Index -1.295 -0.416
(St. Dev. = 0.064 ) (0.689) (0.727)
Control Variables Included in Specification
Neighborhood Sociodemographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Sociodemographics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment Access and Geographic Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs
R
2 0.953 0.954 0.953 0.955
Note: This table reports the results of four specifications of a regression of the standardized elasticity measure on various dissimilarity indices and 
four sets of control variables.  The variables included in each set of controls variables are listed in Appendix Table 4.  Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.
Standardized Conditional Elasticity Measure
1.00
708 708 708 708Table 10 - Regression of Test Scores on Control Variables and Dissimilarity Measures
Dependent Variable
St. Dev. of Dep. Var.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neighborhood Income Dissimilarity Index (/10,000) 6.203 6.591 -3.473 -3.466
(St. Dev. = 1.102 ) (3.539) (3.924) (2.092) (2.108)
House Price Dissimilarity Index (/100) -3.379 -3.919 -9.620 -8.499
(St. Dev. = 2.381 ) (1.603) (1.545) (2.828) (2.600)
Neighborhood Education Dissimilarity Index -93.269 -77.123 -43.583 -31.262 -37.878 -26.809
(St. Dev. = 0.064 ) (35.970) (33.277) (26.278) (27.135) (24.450) (25.405)
Control Variables Included in Specification
Neighborhood Sociodemographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School Sociodemographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employment Access and Geographic Variables Yes Yes Yes
Obs 708 708 708 708 708 708
R
2 0.791 0.785 0.785 0.780 0.789 0.783
Note: This table reports the results of six specifications of a regression of the average 4th grade test score on various combinations of dissimilarity measures  control variables.  The 
variables included in each set of controls variables are listed in Appendix Table 4.  Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Average 4th Grade Test Score




monthly housing price (/1000)
average test score (in standard deviations)
1 if unit owned
number of rooms
1 if built in 1980s




% Census block group black
% Census block group Hispanic
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% block group college degree or more
average block group income










































































































































242,100 27,958 27,958 242,100
Without Neighborhood Sociodemographics With Neighborhood Sociodemographics
full sample full sample within .25 mile of boundaries within .25 mile of boundaries
Note: Specifications shown in the table also include controls for land use (% industrial, % residential, % commercial, % open space, % other) in 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5 mile rings around location and six variables that characterize the housing stock in each of these Average Monthly Owner Number of Built in  Built in Elevation Population  Crime Index Distance to
Test Score House Price Occupied Rooms 1980s 1960-1979 Density Work
Household Characteristics (+1 s.d.) (/1000) (/100)
household income 0.050 0.121 0.305 0.074 0.142 0.038 0.016 0.028 -0.001 -0.004
(/10,000) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.009) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001)
1 if children under 18 in household -0.190 0.063 -0.102 0.544 -0.316 0.146 0.010 -0.740 0.015 0.036
(0.047) (0.065) (0.094) (0.025) (0.112) (0.083) (0.022) (0.101) (0.005) (0.005)
1 if black -1.395 -0.941 -0.510 0.152 0.004 0.401 -0.062 -1.285 0.110 -0.023
(0.080) (0.127) (0.167) (0.044) (0.211) (0.144) (0.041) (0.159) (0.007) (0.011)
1 if Hispanic -0.642 0.168 -0.036 -0.268 -0.180 -0.157 -0.104 -0.155 0.050 0.014
(0.072) (0.122) (0.130) (0.036) (0.164) (0.115) (0.040) (0.136) (0.007) (0.007)
1 if Asian -0.167 0.315 1.765 -0.503 1.037 0.686 -0.015 0.941 0.030 0.003
(0.062) (0.080) (0.122) (0.031) (0.145) (0.108) (0.028) (0.095) (0.006) (0.007)
1 if college degree or more 0.787 0.917 -0.032 -0.012 0.489 -0.045 0.225 -0.007 0.031 -0.006
(0.053) (0.071) (0.108) (0.029) (0.135) (0.093) (0.024) (0.111) (0.006) (0.006)
1 if working 0.007 0.244 0.563 0.032 0.641 0.406 -0.048 -0.437 -0.027 -0.858
(0.049) (0.067) (0.103) (0.027) (0.125) (0.086) (0.025) (0.097) (0.005) (0.008)
age (years) 0.015 0.010 0.090 0.004 -0.034 -0.009 0.003 -0.006 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: The parameters shown describe the elements of the utility function that interact household characteristics, shown in row headings, with choice characteristics, shown in column headings.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
Neighborhood Attributes
Appendix Table 2. Interaction Parameter Estimates - Model Without Neighborhood Sociodemographics
House CharacteristicsAverage Monthly Owner Number of Built in  Built in Elevation Population  Crime Index % Block % Block % Block % Blk Group Blk Group Distance to
Test Score House Price Occupied Rooms 1980s 1960-1979 Density Group Black Group Hisp Group Asian College Avg Income Work
Household Characteristics (+1 s.d.) (/1000) (/100) (miles)
household income 0.020 0.121 0.303 0.076 0.144 0.028 0.010 0.011 -0.001 -0.223 0.113 -0.009 0.385 0.012 -0.004
(+10,000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.012) (0.009) (0.002) (0.017) (0.001) (0.060) (0.064) (0.039) (0.034) (0.002) (0.001)
1 if children under 18 in household 0.102 0.231 -0.238 0.582 -0.399 0.095 0.051 -0.947 0.002 1.594 2.294 1.857 -2.171 0.055 0.027
(0.058) (0.075) (0.103) (0.028) (0.122) (0.092) (0.025) (0.127) (0.006) (0.416) (0.527) (0.387) (0.331) (0.016) (0.005)
1 if black -0.282 0.143 -1.006 0.002 0.027 0.577 -0.068 -1.106 0.045 14.874 7.082 7.371 2.607 -0.023 -0.010
(0.116) (0.170) (0.205) (0.053) (0.253) (0.184) (0.052) (0.228) (0.009) (0.560) (0.888) (0.747) (0.680) (0.035) (0.013)
1 if Hispanic -0.077 0.204 -0.138 -0.246 -0.147 -0.248 -0.067 -0.128 0.005 4.435 12.471 2.757 0.830 0.011 0.012
(0.089) (0.139) (0.147) (0.041) (0.185) (0.131) (0.045) (0.169) (0.008) (0.568) (0.620) (0.587) (0.492) (0.022) (0.008)
1 if Asian 0.072 0.558 1.633 -0.571 0.612 0.457 -0.006 -0.053 0.006 4.236 3.330 14.060 -0.016 -0.022 0.012
(0.078) (0.095) (0.138) (0.035) (0.166) (0.123) (0.033) (0.132) (0.007) (0.562) (0.721) (0.429) (0.449) (0.022) (0.007)
1 if college degree or more 0.200 0.501 0.428 0.006 0.588 0.106 0.031 0.486 0.022 1.279 -0.638 -1.935 8.986 0.009 0.009
(0.065) (0.079) (0.118) (0.032) (0.148) (0.101) (0.027) (0.134) (0.007) (0.504) (0.607) (0.450) (0.366) (0.020) (0.007)
1 if working 0.093 0.272 0.604 0.021 0.897 0.425 0.023 -0.515 -0.019 -0.712 -0.335 -0.434 -1.931 0.033 -0.896
(0.062) (0.074) (0.113) (0.030) (0.138) (0.096) (0.028) (0.125) (0.007) (0.444) (0.563) (0.436) (0.350) (0.016) (0.009)
age (years) 0.013 0.011 0.097 0.003 -0.033 -0.010 0.003 -0.011 0.001 -0.022 -0.085 -0.005 -0.018 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) (0.001) (0.000)
Note: The parameters shown describe the elements of the utility function that interact household characteristics, shown in row headings, with choice characteristics, shown in column headings.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Appendix Table 3. Interaction Parameter Estimates - Model With Neighborhood Sociodemographics
House Characteristics Neighborhood Attributes Neighborhood SociodemographicsAppendix Table 4 - List of Variables Included in Each Set of Controls
Neighborhood Sociodemographics Neighborhood Race-dEucation-Income Interactions
percent black in catchment area percent asian*average income in catchment area
percent asian in catchment area percent black*average income in catchment area
percent hispanic in catchment area percent hispanic*average income in catchment area
percent of householders with higher education percent asian*proportion high school graduates in catchment area
average household income in catchment area percent asian*proportion with some college in catchment area
average age in catchment area percent asian*proportion with college degree
proportion of households with children under 18 in catchment area percent asian*proportion with advanced degree
proportion of householders who do not work in catchment area percent black*proportion high school graduates in catchment area
percent black*proportion with some college in catchment area
Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics percent black*proportion with college degree
average monthly house price in catchment area percent black*proportion with advanced degree
proportion of homeowners in catchment area percent hispanic*proportion high school graduates in catchment area
average number of rooms in psuedo-catchment area percent hispanic*proportion with some college in catchment area
crime index in catchment area percent hispanic*proportion with college degree
proportion of houses built in the 1980's in catchment area percent hispanic*proportion with advanced degree
proportion of houses built in the 1960's & 70's in catchment area
population density in catchment area Higher-Order House Price and Income Terms
average house price squared
School Sociodemographics average household income squared
percent 4th grade AFDC average household income cubed
percent 4th grade moved in past year average household income to the fourth power
percent of asian students in grade 4
percent of black students in grade 4 Land Use Variables
percent of hispanic students in grade 4 proportion of industrial land use in 1 mile radius
percent of white students in grade 4 proportion of commercial land use in 1 mile radius
Seven grade 4 parental education categories proportion of other urban land in 1 mile radius
Four grade 4 parental language categories proportion of open space in 1 mile radius
Employment Access and Geographic Variables
employment accessibility index for high school dropouts
employment accessibility index for high school graduates
employment accessibility index for those with some college
employment accessibility index for college graduates





Note: This table lists the control variables included in each set of controls used in the analysis reported in Tables 7-10.Appendix Table 5 - Regressions of Test Score on School Elasticity Measure with Control Variables
Dependent Variable
St. Dev. of Dep. Var.
Variable f Coefficient Std Error
standardized conditional elasticity measure 9.651 3.256
percent black in catchment area 49.696 43.234
percent asian in catchment area -50.009 32.223
percent hispanic in catchment area 34.204 42.690
percent of householders with higher education in catchment area 19.461 40.046
average income in catchment area 0.000 0.000
average age of catchment area 0.936 1.313
proportion of households with children under 18 in catchment area 77.380 32.513
proportion of householders who do not work in catchment area 8.275 63.310
average monthly house price in catchment area 0.003 0.019
proportion of homeowners in catchment area -30.637 25.717
average number of rooms in catchment area -14.155 7.093
crime index in catchment area 0.062 0.636
proportion of houses built in the 1980's in catchment area -17.401 14.452
proportion of houses built in the 1960's & 70's in catchment area -3.915 11.689
population density in catchment area -3.928 10.449
c4pafdc -0.544 0.248
c4pmobil -0.423 0.176
percent of asian students in grade 4 0.372 0.124
percent of black students in grade 4 -0.331 0.214
percent of hispanic students in grade 4 -0.361 0.101
percent of white students in grade 4 0.320 0.106
percent grade 4 parental education category 1 1.237 1.826
percent grade 4 parental education category 2 1.103 1.794
percent grade 4 parental education category 3 0.452 1.824
percent grade 4 parental education category 4 0.380 1.866
percent grade 4 parental education category 5 0.025 1.804
percent grade 4 parental education category 6 -0.149 1.961
percent grade 4 parental education category 7 0.796 1.875
percent grade 4 parental language category 1 -4.281 3.397
percent grade 4 parental language category 2 -4.057 3.432
percent grade 4 parental language category 3 -4.496 3.437
percent grade 4 parental language category 4 0.198 0.195
employment accessibility index for high school dropouts -0.049 0.014
employment accessibility index for high school graduates 0.015 0.017
employment accessibility index for those with some college 0.007 0.022
employment accessibility index for college graduates 0.000 0.013
employment accessibility index for those with an advanced degree 0.009 0.016
school latitude -1025.008 3331.935
school longitude 5781.304 24468.960
school latitude squared 13.305 44.360
school longitude squared 11.841 50.081
Obs
R2




Average School Test Score